A. Atay, T. Solymosi
We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (David and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).
Palabras clave / Keywords: bargaining set, core, matching market, assignment game, cooperative game
Programado
Sesión GT06-1 Teoría de Juegos: Teoría de Juegos Cooperativos (JUEGOS-1b). Organizador: Juan Vidal-Puga
29 de mayo de 2018 17:00
Sala 4