J. Martínez de Albéniz, C. Rafels, N. Ybern
We analyze assortative assignment games, introduced in Becker (1973) and Eriksson et al. (2000). We study the extreme core points and show an easy way to compute them. We find a natural solution which we call Becker’s solution for these games. It coincides with several well-known point solutions, the median stable utility solution (Schwarz and Yenmez, 2011) and the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969). We also analyze the behavior of the Shapley value. We finish with some extensions, where some hypotheses are relaxed.
Palabras clave / Keywords: assortative market, assignment game, core, nucleolus
Programado
Sesión V06 Teoría de Juegos III
1 de junio de 2018 16:00
Sala 5
