R. van den Brink, M. Núñez Oliva, F. Robles
In two-sided markets with transferable utility, we characterize the buyers-optimal (sellers-optimal) stable rule as the only stable rule that satisfies valuation monotonicity (valuation antimonotonicity). This result resembles the axiomatization of the deferred acceptance mechanism of Kojima and Menea (2010) for ordinal two-sided markets. Adding a consistency axiom, the above two rules are characterized in the general domain of allocation rules for two-sided assignment markets with variable population. Moreover, the fair division rule, which payoff vector is the average of the buyers-optimal and the sellers-optimal payoff vectors, is characterized as the only stable rule that satisfies weak valuation fairness. This property is a weaker form of valuation fairness, which is satisfied by the Shapley value in the class of assignment games but is not satisfied by any stable rule. Instead we show that this weaker form of valuation fairness is compatible with stability.
Palabras clave / Keywords: assignment games, stable rules, monotonicity, fair division
Programado
Sesión GT06-1 Teoría de Juegos: Teoría de Juegos Cooperativos (JUEGOS-1a). Organizador: Juan Vidal-Puga
29 de mayo de 2018 15:20
Sala 4
