M. Pulido Cayuela, G. Bergantiños, M. Gómez Rua, N. Llorca Pascual, J. Sánchez-Soriano
In a set covering problem, a set of customers need a service that can be provided by a set of facilities. In operations research literature, a key question is to decide which facilities to open, from a given set of possible locations, in order to connect every customer to at least one facility. In this paper we address the question of how to allocate the total cost in a set covering situation through a game theoretic approach. We focus on set covering situations where the optimal covering is given in advance. We take only into account the opened facilities and we will look for rules distributing the cost of the given coverage. Associated with each set covering situation a cooperative game can be defined. We characterize the core of this game which is always non empty. We consider some suitable properties that an allocation rule for set covering situations could satisfy. Three allocation rules are introduced and characterized by means of some of these properties.
Palabras clave / Keywords: game theory, set covering situation, core, allocation rule
Programado
Sesión GT06-2 Teoría de Juegos: Teoría de Juegos y Transporte (JUEGOS-2). Organizador: Juan Vidal Puga
31 de mayo de 2018 10:20
Sala 5
