E. Algaba, V. Fragnelli, N. Llorca Pascual, J. Sánchez-Soriano
We deal with the problem of sharing the revenue allocation derived from the cooperation among several transport companies. The involved companies offer travel cards which can be used in an intermodal public transport system. To solve this problem, we introduce a new allocation rule and we analyze its properties. We prove that this allocation rule coincides with the Shapley value of a convex game which adds significant properties to the solution, guaranteeing stability in this cooperation context. The advantages of the proposed solution are highlighted with the analysis of an application.
Palabras clave / Keywords: TU-game, revenue sharing, Shapley value
Programado
Sesión GT06-2 Teoría de Juegos: Teoría de Juegos y Transporte (JUEGOS-2). Organizador: Juan Vidal Puga
31 de mayo de 2018 10:20
Sala 5
