J. Freixas Bosch, M. Pons Vallès
Simple majority is a very common rule to make collective decisions in a voting context. Following this rule, each individual can either be in favor of the proposal, be indifferent to it, or be against it. The proposal is approved if the number of votes in favor of it is greater than the number of votes against it, it is rejected in the opposite case, and there may be a tie if the number of votes for both sides coincides. May’s well-known result axiomatically characterizes simple majority rule.
A more general situation is considered here: several symmetric degrees of positive and negative support for the submitted proposal are allowed to voters, so that the voting rules considered by May to characterize the simple majority rule correspond to a particular case.
The main contribution of this work provides a set of independent axioms which uniquely characterizes a function that has all the ingredients of the simple majority rule and moreover it gives a different version of May's result.
Palabras clave / Keywords: voting systems, simple majority rule, independent axiomatic characterizations
Programado
Sesión M03 Teoría de Juegos I
30 de mayo de 2018 10:50
Sala 5
