J. M. Giménez Pradales, M. Domènech Blàzquez, M. A. Puente del Campo
Each semivalue, as a solution concept defined on cooperative games with a finite set of players, is univocally determined by weighting coefficients that apply to players’ marginal contributions. Taking into account that a semivalue induces semivalues on lower cardinalities, we prove that its weighting coefficients can be reconstructed from the last weighting coefficients of its induced semivalues. Moreover, we provide the conditions of a sequence of numbers in order to be the family of the last coefficients of any induced semivalues. As a consequence of this fact, we give two characterizations of each semivalue defined on cooperative games with a finite set of players: one, among all semivalues; another, among all solution concepts on cooperative games.
Palabras clave / Keywords: semivalue, weighting coefficient, induced semivalue, unanimity game, axiomatization
Programado
Sesión M03 Teoría de Juegos I
30 de mayo de 2018 10:50
Sala 5
